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Abstract
The Anderson-Friedman absolute objects program has been a favorite analysis of the
substantive general covariance that supposedly characterizes Einstein’s General The-
ory of Relativity (GTR). Absolute objects are the same locally in all models (modulo
gauge freedom). Substantive general covariance is the lack of absolute objects. Sev-
eral counterexamples have been proposed, however, including the Jones-Geroch dust
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and Torretti constant curvature spaces counterexamples. The Jones-Geroch dust case,
ostensibly a false positive, is resolved by noting that holes in the dust in some models
ensure that no physically relevant nonvanishing timelike vector field exists there, so no
absolute object exists. The Torretti constant curvature spaces case, allegedly a false
negative, is resolved by testing an irreducible piece of the metric, the conformal metric
density of weight -2/3, for absoluteness; this geometric object is absolute. A new coun-
terexample is proposed involving the orthonormal tetrad said to be necessary to couple
spinors to a curved metric. The threat of finding an absolute object in GTR + spinors
is overcome by the use of an alternative spinor formalism that takes a symmetric square
root of the metric (with the help of the matrix diag(-1,1,1,1)), eliminating 6 of the 16
tetrad components as irrelevant. The importance of eliminating irrelevant structures,
as Anderson emphasized, is clear. The importance of the choice of physical fields is also
evident. A new counterexample due to Robert Geroch and Domenico Giulini, however,
finds an absolute object in vacuum GTR itself, namely the scalar density g given by
the metric components’ determinant. Thus either the definition of absoluteness or its
use to analyze GTR’s substantive general covariance is flawed. Anderson’s belief that
all absolute objects are nonvariational (that is, not varied in a suitable action princi-
ple) and vice versa is also falsified by the Geroch-Giulini counterexample. However,
it remains plausible that all nonvariational fields are absolute, so adding nonvariation-
ality as a necessary condition for absoluteness, as Hiskes once suggested, would likely
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leave no useful work to the Anderson-Friedman condition of sameness in all models.
Simply having only variational fields in an action principle (suitably free of irrelevant
fields) might be a satisfactory analysis of substantive general covariance, if one exists.
This proposal also resembles the suggestion that GTR is “already parameterized,” if
one decides to parameterize theories by defining the nonvariational fields in terms of
preferred coordinates called clock fields. More questions need to be addressed. Which
fields should be tested for absoluteness: only primitive fields (which ones?), or all or
some (which?) of their concomitants also? Geroch observes that some kinds of geo-
metric objects, such as tangent vectors, scalar densities, and tangent vector densities
of non-unit weight, satisfy the condition of sameness in all models if they merely fail
to vanish. If these “susceptible” geometric objects can hardly help being absolute, to
what degree are they, or the theories harboring them, responsible for this absoluteness?
The answer to this question helps to determine the significance of the Geroch-Giulini
counterexample.
1 Introduction
James L. Anderson analyzed the novelty of Einstein’s so-called General Theory of
Relativity (GTR) as its lacking “absolute objects” (Anderson, 1967; Anderson, 1971).
Metaphorically, absolute objects are often described as a fixed stage on which the
dynamical actors play their parts. A review of Anderson’s definitions will be useful.
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Absolute objects are to be contrasted with dynamical objects. The values of the
absolute objects do not depend on the values of the dynamical objects, but the values of
the dynamical objects do depend on the values of the absolute objects (Anderson, 1967,
p. 83). Both absolute objects and dynamical objects are, mathematically speaking,
geometric objects or parts thereof. Trautman defines geometric objects as follows:
Let X be an n-dimensional differentiable manifold.. . .
Let p ∈ X be an arbitrary point of X and let {xa}, {xa′} be two systems of
local coordinates around p. A geometric object field y is a correspondence
y : (p, {xa})→ (y1, y2, · · · yN ) ∈ RN
which associates with every point p ∈ X and every system of local coordi-
nates {xa} around p, a set of N real numbers, together with a rule which
determines (y1′ , · · · yN ′), given by
y : (p, {xa′})→ (y1′ , · · · yN ′) ∈ RN
in terms of the (y1, y2, · · · yN ) and the values of [sic] p of the functions
and their partial derivatives which relate the coordinate systems {xa} and
{xa′}.. . . The N numbers (y1, · · ·yN ) are called the components of y at p
with respect to the coordinates {xa}. (Trautman, 1965, pp. 84, 85)
Geometric objects were considered with great thoroughness by Albert Nijenhuis (Ni-
jenhuis, 1952) and by Kucharzewski and Kuczma (Kucharzewski and Kuczma, 1964).
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Before absolute objects can be defined, the notion of a covariance group must
be outlined. Here it will prove helpful to draw upon the unjustly neglected work
of Kip Thorne, Alan Lightman, and David Lee (TLL) (Thorne et al., 1973); a useful
companion paper (LLN) was written by Lee, Lightman and W.-T. Ni (Lee et al., 1974).
According to TLL,
A group G is a covariance group of a representation if (i) G maps [kinemati-
cally possible trajectories] of that representation into [kinematically possible
trajectories]; (ii) the [kinematically possible trajectories] constitute “the ba-
sis of a faithful representation of G” (i.e., no two elements of G produce
identical mappings of the [kinematically possible trajectories]); (iii) G maps
[dynamically possible trajectories] into [dynamically possible trajectories].
(Thorne et al., 1973, p. 3567)
One can now define absolute objects. They are, according to Anderson, objects with
components φα such that
(1) The φα constitute the basis of a faithful realization of the covariance
group of the theory. (2) Any φα that satisfies the equations of motion of the
theory appears, together with all its transforms under the covariance group,
in every equivalence class of [dynamically possible trajectories]. (Anderson,
1967, p. 83)
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Thus the components of the absolute objects are the same, up to equivalence under
the covariance group, in every model of the theory. It is the dynamical objects that
distinguish the different equivalence classes of the dynamically possible trajectories
(Anderson, 1967, p. 84).
It has been asserted that there is a sense in which GTR is nontrivially or strongly
generally covariant, and that this is its lack of absolute objects (Anderson, 1967) or
“prior geometry” (Misner et al., 1973, pp. 429-431). John Norton discusses this claim
with some sympathy (Norton, 1992; Norton, 1993; Norton, 1995), though technical
problems such as the Jones-Geroch dust and Torretti constant spatial curvature coun-
terexamples are among his worries (Norton, 1993; Norton, 1995). Anderson and Ronald
Gautreau encapsulate the definition of an absolute object as an object that “affects the
behavior of other objects but is not affected by these objects in turn.” (Anderson and
Gautreau, 1969, p. 1657) Anderson claims that absolute objects violate what he calls
a “generalized principle of action and reaction” (Anderson, 1967, p. 339) (Anderson,
1971, p. 169). Norton has argued, rightly I think, that such a principle is hopelessly
vague and arbitrary and that it should not be invoked to impart a spurious necessity to
the contingent truth that our best current physical theory lacks them (Norton, 1993,
pp. 848, 849)—except that the scalar density counterexample will show that our best
current physical theory has one!
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In Anderson’s framework, an important subgroup of a theory’s covariance group
is its symmetry group (Anderson, 1967, pp. 84-88). One first defines the symmetry
group of a geometrical object as those transformations that leave the object unchanged.
The symmetry group of a physical theory is
the largest subgroup of the covariance group of this theory, which is si-
multaneously the symmetry group of its absolute objects. In particular, if
the theory has no absolute objects, then the symmetry group of the phys-
ical system under consideration is just the covariance group of this theory.
(Anderson, 1967, p. 87)
Thus having fewer absolute objects leaves a larger symmetry group.
Finding Anderson’s definition obscure, Michael Friedman amended it in the in-
terest of clarity (Friedman, 1973; Friedman, 1983). As it turns out, Friedman has
made a number of changes to Anderson’s definitions, not all for the better. First,
Friedman’s equivalence relation, which he calls d-equivalence, comprises only diffeo-
morphism freedom (Friedman, 1983, pp. 58-60), not other kinds of gauge freedom such
as “internal groups” (Anderson, 1967, pp. 35, 36) like local Lorentz freedom or electro-
magnetic or Yang-Mills gauge freedom, or combined internal-external supersymmetry
transformations. Second, Friedman’s mathematical language is less general than An-
derson’s and fails to accommodate some useful mathematical entities that Anderson’s
permits. Anderson knows what sorts of mathematical structures physicists need, while
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Friedman restricts his attention to that narrower collection of entities that all modern
coordinate-free treatments of gravitation or (pseudo-)Riemannian geometry presently
discuss, namely tensors and connections, but not, for example, tensor densities, which
are important for two examples below. Tensor densities, even of fractional or irrational
weight, are useful or crucial in a variety of applications, including the modern canonical
quantum gravity project, the conformal-traceless decomposition of the spatial metric
in numerical work in general relativity, and massive theories of gravity. Accidentally
restricting one’s vocabulary in this way also prevents one from using irreducible geo-
metric objects, thus dooming one to wrong answers for the Torretti and Geroch-Giulini
cases. Friedman’s mathematical language also excludes spinors, whether of the usual
orthonormal tetrad formalism or the less common formalism of V. I. Ogievetski˘i and
I. V. Polubarinov (Ogievetski˘i and Polubarinov, 1965), to be discussed below. A third
difference pertains to the notion of standard formulations of a theory. Anderson (some-
what confusingly) and TLL require that theories should be coordinate-covariant under
arbitrary manifold mappings. Friedman, by contrast, takes as standard a form in
which the absolute objects, if possible, have constant components (Friedman, 1983, p.
60). Friedman implies that one can always choose coordinates such that the absolute
objects (a) have constant components and (b) thus drop out of the theory’s differen-
tial equations. However, these claims both suffer from counterexamples. Concerning
(a), (anti-)de Sitter background metrics of a single value of curvature are absolute
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but do not have constant components. Concerning (b), absolute objects can appear
algebraically in the field equations, not just differently, so their components need not
drop out even if constant (Freund et al., 1969). Thus the Thorne-Lee-Lightman fully
reduced generally covariant formulation is therefore preferable to Friedman’s standard
formulation. Friedman’s expectation that the components of absolute objects could be
reduced to constants in general, though incorrect, usefully calls attention to the role (or
lack thereof) of Killing vector fields and the like in analyzing absolute objects. TLL’s
additional category of “confined” objects is a useful supplement to geometric objects
and can accommodate various structures that savor of absoluteness without satisfying
a definition of absolute objects designed for geometric objects.
2 Jones-Geroch counterexample and Friedman’s
reply
With a clear grasp of absolute objects in hand, one can now consider the Jones-Geroch
counterexample that claims that the 4-velocity of cosmic dust counts, absurdly, as an
absolute object by Friedman’s or Anderson’s standards. Friedman concedes some force
to this objection made by Robert Geroch and amplified by Roger Jones, here related
by Friedman:
. . . [A]s Robert Geroch has observed, since any two timelike, nowhere-vanishing
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vector fields defined on a relativistic space-time are d-equivalent, it follows
that any such vector field counts as an absolute object according to [Fried-
man’s criterion]; and this is surely counter-intuitive. Fortunately, however,
this problem does not arise in the context of any of the space-time theories
I discuss. It could arise in the general relativistic theory of “dust” if we
formulate the theory in terms of a quintuple 〈M,D, g, ρ, U〉, where ρ is the
density of the “dust” and U is its velocity field. U is nonvanishing and thus
would count as an absolute object by my definition. But here it seems more
natural to formulate the theory as a quadruple 〈M,D, g, ρU〉 where ρU is
the momentum field of the “dust.” Since ρU does vanish in some models,
it will not be absolute. (Geroch’s observation was conveyed to me by Roger
Jones, who also suggested the example of the general relativistic theory of
“dust.”. . . ) (Friedman, 1983, p. 59)
Friedman’s response is nearly satisfactory, though it has two weaknesses as he ex-
pressed it. I will discuss the more serious one. He states that ρU, the mass density
times the 4-velocity, does vanish in some models, but he should have said that “ρU
does vanish in some neighborhoods in some models” to show that he is considering
only genuine models of GTR + dust, in which dust vanishes in some neighborhoods in
some models, rather than some models with (omnipresent?) dust and some degenerate
models which nominally have dust but actually have no dust anywhere. Clearly some
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models with dust have neighborhoods lacking dust, and it is these models which will
prevent the dust 4-velocity from constituting an absolute object. The Jones-Geroch
counterexample fails because there is no physically meaningful everywhere (nonvanish-
ing) timelike vector field in the set of solutions of GTR + dust, because there is none
where the dust has holes in some models. Not just globally irrelevant fields, but locally
irrelevant portions of fields should be excluded before testing a theory for absolute
objects.
3 Hiskes’s redefinition of absoluteness, Maid-
ens’s worry, and Rosen’s answer in advance
To address the Jones-Geroch dust counterexample, Anne Hiskes proposed amending
the definition of absolute objects so that no field varied in a theory’s action principle
would be regarded as absolute (Hiskes, 1984). Such a move makes use of what seemed
to be a true generalization about absolute and dynamical objects to both Anderson
(Anderson, 1967, pp. 88, 89) and Thorne, Lee, Lightman and Ni (Thorne et al., 1973;
Lee et al., 1974). Let use call objects “(non)variational” if they are (not) varied in
an action principle (Gotay et al., 2004). We have seen that Hiskes’s amendment is
not necessary to resolve the Jones-Geroch dust counterexample. Anna Maidens has
suggested that there might be some way to reformulate special relativistic theories such
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that the flat metric, which surely ought to count as absolute, is varied in the action
principle. If that could be done, then Hiskes’s definition of absolute objects would prove
to be too strict (the opposite problem from what the Jones-Geroch example suggests
about Friedman’s), because it fails to count the metric tensor of special relativity as
an absolute object in some formulations. Maidens’s conjecture is correct that one can
derive the flatness of a metric from a variational principle with the help of Lagrange
multipliers, as was shown long ago by Nathan Rosen and again more recently by
Rafael Sorkin (Rosen, 1966; Rosen, 1973; Sorkin, 2002). So Hiskes’s move seems
unpromising. However, one might argue that the Rosen-Sorkin Lagrange multiplier
fields are irrelevant fields and so should not be used. Given the qualification that
irrelevant variables should be excluded, Hiskes’s proposal might yet have some use in
addressing other counterexamples.
Does it follow that Anderson’s and others’ intuition that fields are absolute iff nonva-
riational is vindicated? Before accepting such a claim, one must address parameterized
theories (Sundermeyer, 1982; Kucharˇ, 1973; Arkani-Hamed et al., 2003; Norton, 2003;
Earman, 2003), in which preferred coordinates are rendered variational. Because the
resulting “clock fields” XA are scalars and their gradients are linearly independent, the
Noether-Bianchi identities ensure that δS
δXA
= 0 due to the other fields’ Euler-Lagrange
equations, even if XA are nonvariational. If we stipulate that fields should only be
varied only there is some benefit to doing so, then preferred coordinates usually should
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not be varied.
4 Torretti’s and Norton’s examples have abso-
lute objects
A second long-standing worry concerning the Anderson-Friedman absolute objects
project was suggested by Roberto Torretti (Torretti, 1984). He considered a theory of
modified Newtonian kinematics in which each model’s space has constant curvature,
but different models have different values of that curvature. Because every model’s
space has constant curvature, such a theory surely has something rather like an ab-
solute object in it, Torretti’s intuition suggests. Though contrived, this example is
relevantly like the cases of de Sitter or anti-de Sitter background metrics of constant
curvature that are sometimes discussed in the physics literature, where one often lumps
together space-times with different values of constant curvature. The failure of the met-
rics to be locally diffeomorphically equivalent for distinct curvature values entails that
the metric tensor does not satisfy Anderson’s or Friedman’s definition of an absolute
object (or TLL’s, for that matter). But it seems intuitively clear to Torretti that his
theory has an absolute object, so he infers that Friedman’s analysis is wrong.
I observe that the Anderson-Friedman analysis, when applied to Torretti’s example,
actually does yield a very specific and reasonable conclusion involving an absolute
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object. Though the spatial metric is not absolute, the conformal spatial metric density,
a symmetric (0, 2) tensor density of weight −23 (or its (2, 0) weight 23 inverse) is an
absolute object. This entity, when its components are expressed as a matrix, has unit
determinant. It appears routinely in the conformal-traceless decomposition used in
finding initial data in numerical studies of GTR. It defines angles and relative lengths of
vectors at a point, but permits no comparison of lengths of vectors at different points.
In three dimensions, conformal flatness of a metric is expressed by the vanishing of
the Cotton tensor (Aldersley, 1979; Garcia et al., 2004), not the Weyl tensor, which
vanishes identically. That the conformal metric density is an absolute object is shown
in the following way. Every space with constant curvature is conformally flat (Wolf,
1967). For conformally flat spatial metrics, manifestly the conformal parts are equal in
a neighborhood up to diffeomorphisms. The conformal part just is the conformal metric
density. Concerning Norton’s modification of Torretti’s example to Robertson-Walker
space-time metrics (Norton, 1993, p. 848), analogous comments could be made: these
space-times are conformally flat (Infeld and Schild, 1945) and so have as an absolute
object the space-time conformal metric density. In neither case is the conformal metric
density the only absolute objects present, but it suffices to observe that it is present.
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5 Tetrad-spinor: Avoiding absolute object by
eliminating irrelevant fields
One potential counterexample to the Anderson-Friedman project that seems not to
have been noticed until now (Pitts, 2006) arises from the use of an orthonormal tetrad
formalism, in which the metric tensor (or its inverse) is built out of four orthonormal
vector fields eµA by the formula g
µν = eµAη
ABeνB or the like. Four vector fields have
among them 16 components, rather more than the 10 components of the metric, so
there is some redundancy that leaves a new local Lorentz gauge freedom to make
arbitrary position-dependent boosts and rotations of the tetrad. It is unnecessary to
use a tetrad instead of a metric as the fundamental field when gravity (as described by
GTR) is coupled to bosonic matter (represented by tensors, tensor densities or perhaps
connections). However, it is widely believed to be necessary to use an orthonormal
tetrad to couple gravity to the spinor fields that represent electrons, protons, and
the like (Weinberg, 1972; Deser and Isham, 1976). The threat of a counterintuitive
absolute object then arises. Given both local Lorentz and coordinate freedom, one can
certainly bring the timelike tetrad leg into the component form (1, 0, 0, 0) at least in a
neighborhood about any point. Unlike the dust case, there cannot be any spacetime
region in any model such that the timelike leg of the tetrad vanishes. Thus GTR
coupled to a spinor field using an orthonormal tetrad gives an example of a Gerochian
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vector field: nowhere vanishing, everywhere timelike, gauge-equivalent to (1, 0, 0, 0),
and (allegedly) required to couple the spinor and gravity and thus not irrelevant. If
it is true that coupling spinors to gravity requires an orthonormal tetrad and that an
orthonormal tetrad formalism for GTR yields an absolute object, then the intuitively
absurd conclusion that GTR + spinors has an absolute object follows.
The tetrad-spinor example seems rather more serious a problem for definitions of
absolute objects than the Jones-Geroch cosmological dust example was, because the
spinor field is surely closer to being a fundamental field than is dust or any other per-
fect fluid. The solution seems to be the following: one can remove irrelevant fields
here and thus avoid this unexpected absolute object. This removal is achieved using
the alternative spinor formalism of V. I. Ogievetski˘i and I. V. Polubarinov (Ogievetski˘i
and Polubarinov, 1965) to eliminate “enough” of the orthonormal tetrad as irrelevant
that the timelike nowhere vanishing vector field disappears from the theory. A brief
summary suffices here. Their formalism’s symmetric “square root of the metric” re-
sembles an orthonormal tetrad gauge-fixed to form a symmetric matrix by sacrificing
the local Lorentz freedom while preserving diffeomorphism freedom. The square root
of the metric has only ten components rather than sixteen and can be computed us-
ing a binomial series expansion or generalized eigenvector formalism. This work was
followed among high energy physicists with further discussion of nonlinear group rep-
resentations. To handle the double-valuedness of spinors, I suggest treating spinors as
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equivalence classes defined only up to a sign. Geometric objects have been generalized
to admit equivalence classes by Siwek (Siwek, 1965), who called the results “geometric
pseudoobjects.”
6 Geroch-Giulini scalar density example: Does
GTR have an absolute object?
Unimodular GTR was invented by Einstein and was discussed by Anderson along with
David Finkelstein (Anderson and Finkelstein, 1971). Though it is rather well known
today (Earman, 2003), still it turns out that consideration of unimodular GTR helps
one to reach the startling conclusion that not only it, but GTR itself, has an absolute
object on Friedman’s definition. This fact was pointed out in 2005 by Robert Geroch
(Pitts, 2006) and in 2006 by Domenico Giulini (Giulini, 2006). Unimodular GTR
comes in two flavors: the coordinate-restricted version in which only coordinates that
fix the determinant of the metric components matrix to −1, and the weakly generally
covariant version that admits any coordinates with the help of a nonvariational scalar
density of some nonzero weight and a dynamical conformal metric density, which is a
(0, 2) tensor density of weight − 2n or a (2, 0) tensor density of weight 2n in n space-time
dimensions. As Anderson and Finkelstein observe, a metric tensor as a geometric object
is reducible into a conformal metric density and a scalar density. They further observe
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that this scalar density is an absolute object in unimodular GTR. This observation
seems unremarkable because that scalar density is not variational. For comparison,
recall that one can write the Lagrangian density for GTR in terms of the conformal
metric density and a scalar density (Peres, 1963). Surely the result is still GTR and
not some other theory. To my knowledge, no one (prior to Geroch, in effect) has
ever considered whether the scalar density, even if variational, might still count as an
absolute object. Once the question is raised about GTR with the Peres-type variables,
a positive answer seems obvious: GTR has an absolute object, on Friedman’s definition
of local diffeomorphic equivalence. This absolute object is a scalar density of nonzero
weight, because every neighborhood in every model space-time admits coordinates (at
least locally) in which the component of the scalar density has a value of −1. Thus
variationality and absoluteness by Friedman’s standards have come apart for GTR.
Thus either Anderson’s claim that GTR’s novelty lay in its lack of absolute objects,
or his analysis of absolute objects (as modified by Friedman to require only local
diffeomorphic equivalence), is flawed.
7 Which Fields to Test for Absoluteness?
We have seen that the Torretti and Norton theories were thought to lack absolute
objects on the Anderson-Friedman analysis but to have them intuitively; these alleged
false negatives were used to criticize the analysis. We have also seen that GTR was
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thought to lack absolute objects both on the Anderson-Friedman analysis and intu-
itively; this alleged fact was the best advertised application of the analysis. However,
these conclusions are both wrong, as one notices once one pays attention to tensor
densities and irreducible geometric objects. It is tempting (Pitts, 2006) to conclude
that only irreducible geometric objects should be tested for absoluteness, but that is
also wrong. Consider some field in STR on the one hand, and the conformally flat
space-times of the Nordstro¨m-Einstein-Fokker scalar theory of gravity on the other
hand. Both theories have a conformal metric density with vanishing Weyl tensor, so
the conformal metric density is absolute. Both theories have
√−g as an absolute ob-
ject because nonvanishing scalar densities are automatically absolute. But only STR
has an entire metric tensor that is absolute. If one tests only irreducible geometric
objects for absoluteness, then one cannot distinguish the absoluteness of the metric in
STR from the non-absoluteness of the metric in Nordstro¨m’s theory. The absoluteness
of the metric in STR comes not from any flatness property of
√−g, but from a rela-
tion between
√−g and the conformal metric density gˆµν. This relation is expressed in
Ricci-flatness Rµν = 0, which is 10 equations at each space-time point, algebraically.
More strictly, perhaps one should count 9∞4 + 1 equations, nine at each spacetime
point and one further global equation, given the identity ∇µGµν = 0, the automatic
vanishing of the covariant divergence of the Einstein tensor Gµν = Rµν − 12gµνR. One
could divide this relation into 9∞4 equations expressing the constancy of the curvature
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and one more expressing the vanishing (or not) of that constant. While one must test
all the irreducible geometric objects for absoluteness, one must also test some reducible
geometric objects, such as metric tensors, because they can display absoluteness that
is a relation between two irreducible geometric objects rather than a property of one
irreducible field.
8 Geometric Objects Susceptible to Absolute-
ness
As Robert Geroch has pointed out, some kinds of geometric objects, such as tangent
vectors and scalar densities, satisfy the condition of local sameness in all models by
merely failing to vanish. All nonvanishing scalar densities are alike, as are all nonva-
nishing tangent vector fields, modulo coordinate freedom. I note in passing that Ted
Jacobson’s Einstein-Aether theory (Jacobson and Mattingly, 2001),has an absolute ob-
ject in its timelike unit vector field, though he calls the theory generally covariant. I
call the behavior of being the same in all models (locally, modulo coordinate freedom)
simply by virtue of failing to vanish, “susceptibility to absoluteness,” and the fields
that exhibit it “susceptible.”
One might then ask further questions. Here is one question: are there any other
susceptible geometric objects? When I posed that question to Robert Geroch in the
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summer of 2006, he showed that all nonvanishing tangent vector densities, except
weight 1, are susceptible. On the other hand, Geroch showed that no covector density
of any weight (including covectors, weight 0) is susceptible, because w[µ∂νwα] is a
concomitant that can vanish or fail to vanish invariantly. For weight 1 tangent vector
densities, the coordinate divergence is tensorial, so this case is special. I find that if
one considers those with vanishing divergence and those with nonvanishing divergence
separately, then those with nonvanishing divergence are susceptible, as are those with
vanishing divergence. In fact the question of geometric objects that are susceptible
was solved almost in its entirely by Andrzej Zajtz (Zajtz, 1988). Not surprisingly,
every susceptible geometric object has no more components m than there are space-
time dimensions n. Having enough coordinate freedom to achieve the same form locally
intuitively seems like a necessary condition for susceptibility. It is not sufficient: some
but not all geometric objects with no more components m than there are space-time
dimensions n are susceptible to absoluteness.
One also wonders what the significance of the absoluteness of susceptible objects
is. Does their inability to avoid absoluteness excuse them entirely, so that having
susceptible geometric objects does not make a theory guilty of violating substantive
general covariance? Or is that inability to avoid absoluteness the strongest confirma-
tion of their violation of substantive general covariance? The question resembles a
standard puzzle in the free will & determinism literature; unfortunately this parallel
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sheds no light on the answer. Perhaps different kinds of susceptible objects should be
evaluated differently. For example, scalar densities like
√−g, lacking directionality,
intuitively might seem less contrary to strong general covariance than does an object
with a direction, such as a tangent vector or vector density. The difficulty here is to
give principled answers rather than writing in by hand the desired result. Perhaps hav-
ing susceptible objects is a milder violation of strong general covariance than is having
nonsusceptible ones? Unfortunately I do not have compelling answers to these ques-
tions. That is especially unfortunate given that the significance of the Geroch-Giulini
√−g counterexample in GTR is at stake. Perhaps the phenomenon of susceptibility,
which evidently was not anticipated by Anderson, Thorne-Lee-Lightman, Friedman,
or Hiskes, suggests that absolute objects do not form a natural kind the presence of
which points to some deeper meaning such as strong general covariance.
The widespread belief (Anderson, 1967; Thorne et al., 1973) that all absolute ob-
jects are nonvariational and vice versa is falsified by the Geroch-Giulini counterexam-
ple:
√−g must be varied if Einstein’s equations are to be obtained, but √−g = 1
can be achieved in any neighborhood by a coordinate choice. While at least this one
absolute object is variational, the converse remains plausible (to my knowledge): for
theories that putatively describe the whole physical world (with no externally applied
forces), all nonvariational fields are absolute in the sense of local sameness in all models.
One might consider redefining absoluteness by adding nonvariationality as a further
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necessary condition for absoluteness, much as Anne Hiskes once suggested (Hiskes,
1984), but with the Anderson-TLL ban on irrelevant fields enforced. In that case
√−g
would not be absolute, and GTR would have no absolute objects after all, and one
might call that result strong general covariance. But notice that if all nonvariational
fields are locally the same in all models (modulo coordinate freedom), then the core
Anderson-Friedman notion of absoluteness is largely idle; nonvariationality does the
interesting work.
Simply having only variational fields in an action principle (suitably free of irrelevant
fields) might be a satisfactory analysis of substantive general covariance, if one exists—
though clearly it applies only to theories with action principles. That suggestion is not
new, but the motivation in terms of the apparent failure of the Anderson-Friedman
analysis on the grounds given above provides it a fresh urgency. This proposal also
resembles the suggestion that GTR is “already parameterized,” if one decides to param-
eterize theories by defining the nonvariational fields in terms of preferred coordinates
called clock fields. Clock fields just are preferred coordinates, so Einstein’s rejection of
preferred coordinates might hold the key to strong general covariance after all.
Alternatively, one might accept that GTR has an absolute object and infer, pace
Einstein, that absolute objects are just fine. In any case, the phenomenon of sus-
ceptibility makes it difficult to use the Anderson-Friedman analysis to identify some
allegedly virtuous strong general covariance of GTR that earlier theories lacked.
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9 Conclusion
Reviewing the Anderson-Friedman absolute objects program and various possible coun-
terexamples yields a number of lessons. Anderson’s and TLL’s demand that irrelevant
descriptive fluff be removed needs even more attention that they gave it. This de-
mand as written helps to address the tetrad-spinor case. Irrelevance comes in even
more varieties than they imagined, such as local irrelevance for the Jones-Geroch dust
case and irrelevant variationality for clock fields. Furthermore, one’s mathematical
vocabulary should be chosen by the demands of physics, not the accidental fashions of
contemporary differential geometry. Thus spinor fields and tensor densities should be
considered. Otherwise it is difficult or impossible to discuss the tetrad-spinor and Ge-
roch scalar-density examples, while the Torretti counterexample and Norton’s variant
are misjudged as serious. Reducible geometric objects such as metric tensors should be
expressed as concomitants of irreducible ones such as certain scalar and tensor densi-
ties. However, one also needs to test some reducible geometric objects for absoluteness,
such as metric tensors, because some cases of absoluteness are relations between ir-
reducible geometric objects rather than properties of an irreducible geometric object.
Accommodating spinors without irrelevant fields appears to require using nonlinear
geometric objects, or perhaps nonlinear geometric pseudoobjects.
The scalar density counterexample, which arguably is the only serious problem for
the Anderson-Friedman framework, shows that either GTR has an absolute object or
24
the Anderson-Friedman definition of absolute objects is flawed. This case points to
the more general phenomenon of susceptibility to absoluteness for certain geometric
objects with no more components than there are space-time dimensions. It is unclear
whether susceptible objects should be regarded as especially contrary to strong general
covariance, not contrary to it at all, mildly contrary to it, or contrary to it in some
cases but not others. This very profusion of options perhaps suggests that absoluteness
in the Anderson-Friedman sense of sameness in all models is not the right criterion, or
not all of the right criterion, for the violation of strong general covariance. If strong
general covariance is a clear concept that admits analysis, the absence of nonvariational
fields might be it. Nonvariational fields also apparently can be analyzed in terms of
clock fields, so perhaps strong general covariance really is just the lack of preferred
coordinates.
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